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Abstract 
This study analyses household survey data on water and energy climate change mitigation behaviour 
from eleven OECD countries in 2011, and provides new evidence of a complex relationship between 
climate change concerns and mitigation behaviour. Results confirm other studies that climate change 
concerns positively influence mitigation behaviour. However we also find evidence that this 
relationship may be more complex in the sense that adoption of mitigation behaviour may in turn 
change some households’ climate change concerns. This effect more likely occurs in 
‘environmentally-motivated’ households. Conversely, economic incentives in driving energy and 
water mitigation work better in non-environmentally-motivated households. This highlights that a 
portfolio of policies is needed to drive mitigation behaviour. 
Key Words: climate change concerns; economic incentives; household data; mitigation behaviour.  
 
1. Introduction 
To address climate change and reduce carbon footprints, fundamental changes in consumer, producer 
and industry behaviour will be needed (Adger et al., 2005). There are many social, institutional, 
cultural, political and technological influences that help shape countries climate change behaviour, 
which in turn influence subsequent consumer action. Consumer action is important because aspects of 
daily life, such as heating and cooling homes and patterns of water use, have a significant impact on 
greenhouse gas emissions (Gardner and Stern, 2008). This study extends the literature on climate 
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change concerns and household mitigation behaviour by concentrating on two key areas: water and 
energy, and seeks to understand further the complex relationship between behaviour and climate 
change concerns.1 
1.1 Determinants of mitigation behaviour 
Previous research (Stern, 2000; Russell and Fielding, 2010; among others) has suggested that there 
are three key determinants of mitigation behaviour: i) beliefs, attitudes and values; ii) personal 
capabilities (knowledge, income and time); and iii) contextual influences (country influences, 
economic incentives and institutions). Individuals’ climate change concerns, found to be a reflection 
of environmental attitudes, national policies, age, personal experience, location, education, gender, 
political beliefs and income among other factors, are often named as one of the most important 
influences on mitigation behaviour (e.g. Myers et al., 2012; Zaval et al., 2014; Kaesehage et al., 2014; 
Lo, 2015). Values held by individuals are also important (e.g. Ajzen, 1991; Dietz et al., 2005; Oreg 
and Katz-Gerro, 2006) and a distinction is usually made between different types of people, such as 
altruists, who are more likely to evaluate environmental issues based on the costs or benefits to 
humanity as a whole; or egoists, who define nature purely in terms of a personal basis; and 
biospherics who judge environmental issues on the basis of costs or benefits to ecosystems (Milfont et 
al., 2006). Finally, economic incentives are often found to be an effective policy tool in changing 
water and energy consumption behaviour (Grafton et al., 2012; Ohler and Billger, 2014; Giles et al., 
2014).2  
There has been much discussion in the psychological and environmental literature about how 
performing particular forms of behaviour can influence/change people’s attitudes and beliefs. This is 
explained by well-established social psychological consistency theories, such as cognitive dissonance 
and self-perception theory (e.g. Albarracin and Wyer, 2000; Poortinga et al., 2013).  But, we are not 
aware of any analyses of the possible feedback effect from household mitigation behaviour to climate 
change concerns (albeit reverse causality has been found between irrigators’ climate change concerns 
and their farm adaptation behaviour (Wheeler et al., 2013)). It is possible that households who invest 
in expensive mitigation behaviour may consequently feel less concerned. Such evidence exists at the 
country level: Lo (2015) showed that wealthier countries and countries which have a greater ability to 
cope with the consequences of climate change are less concerned in general. The presence of a 
feedback effect from individuals’ behaviour to climate change concerns echoes the literature on the 
so-called ‘rebound effect’ and the possible adverse and unexpected consequences of incentivising pro-
environmental behaviour. 
                                                            
1Climate change mitigation are actions that involve reductions in human emissions of greenhouse gases, while climate 
change adaptation are actions that households take in response to climate change. 
2Attari et al. (2010) also emphasised the importance of individuals’ perceived impact of the effectiveness of action on their 
behaviour. 
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1.2 Rebound effect 
The rebound effect suggests that environmentally-friendly adoption to reduce a resource’s 
consumption may lead to a higher demand of that resource (e.g. Santarius, 2012; Peters et al., 2012; 
Tiefenbeck et al., 2013).  This rebound effect is driven by both financial and psychological influences. 
On the one hand, the financial impact is driven by the relative effects of efficiency gains, price 
reductions and aggregate demand (Sorrell, 2009; Peters et al., 2012; Tiefenbeck et al., 2013). On the 
other hand, the psychological influences on the rebound effect, which this study is most interested in, 
are explained by psychologists as arising from: a) the moral hazard trap: that because the item is more 
efficient, more of it can be used; b) moral leaking: where one’s conscience is appeased and 
consequently less is cared about the issue overall; and c) moral licensing: where the purchase of pro-
environmental technology justifies unfriendly behaviour in another area (Peters et al., 2012; Clot et 
al., 2014).  Other similar terms include guilt reduction, moral cleansing and the warm-glow effect 
(Tiefenbeck et al., 2013). While there is emerging research investigating how these moral 
psychological effects impact behaviour, little is known of their magnitude or which populations are 
more susceptible.  
This paper seeks to investigate the issue of the causality relationship between climate change concerns 
and water and energy mitigation behaviour further using a unique and highly detailed OECD 
(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) household survey database across eleven 
countries. Two-way causality (i.e. concerns driving behaviour and behaviour influencing concerns) 
can be partially tested through the presence of endogeneity in the regression model of interest.3 It is 
important to note that endogeneity may be present for other reasons than a two-way causality 
relationship, for example because of omitted variables or selection bias. The environmental 
economics literature has emphasised the importance of the endogeneity of risk perceptions in models 
describing households’ averting decisions: perceived risk about an environmental threat is a driver of 
averting decisions but averting decisions do, in turn, shape households’ risk perceptions (see 
Bontemps and Nauges (2016) for a discussion of related literature).  
 
2. Data description  
The data is from a 2011 household survey on Environmental Policy and Individual Behaviour Change 
conducted by the OECD Environment Directorate (see OECD, 2014). 12,202 households were 
surveyed in eleven OECD countries: Australia, Canada, Chile, France, Israel, Japan, Korea, the 
Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland. In each country, the online survey sample was stratified 
                                                            
3Technically, in a statistical model of the form Y = Xβ + e, endogeneity arises when the X variable is correlated with the 
error term e. 
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according to age, gender, income and region. Households were surveyed on their opinions, attitudes 
and behaviour related to the environment in five areas: waste recycling, water use, energy use, 
transportation, and food.4 The main variable of interest in this study is respondents’ climate change 
concerns, which are measured on a scale from 0 (climate change is not serious at all) to 10 (climate 
change is extremely serious). We assess its influence on households’ mitigation behaviour in the 
water and energy domains and test for a possible feedback effect (that is, the possibility that behaviour 
could in turn influence climate change concerns). Definitions and summary statistics are shown in 
Table 1. 
One important aspect that needs considering when modelling mitigation behaviour is the cost of such 
behaviour. By cost we mean both the dollar cost of buying/installing a certain technology or product 
and also the opportunity cost of the time involved by households to install an equipment or adopt 
some behaviour. Some behavioural household change (e.g. curtailing habits) is very low cost in terms 
of financial outlays, while other behavioural change (e.g. adoption of efficiency-improving solar 
panels) is very high cost (Hawcroft and Milfont, 2010). This study adopts Gardner and Stern (2008) 
terminology of ‘curtailment mitigation’ (using equipment less frequently or intensively) and 
‘efficiency-improving mitigation’ (e.g. installation of more efficient equipment) to delineate 
mitigation behaviour into two groups (primarily low-cost versus high-cost adoption).5  
Four measures of household mitigation behaviour are built: two curtailment behaviour indexes, one 
each for water and energy, that account for habits/routines or behaviour that does not cost much in 
terms of time or money (Table 2). Curtailment indexes include actions such as turning off lights when 
leaving a room and watering the garden in the coolest part of the day to reduce evaporation, for the 
energy- and water-related indexes respectively. Two efficiency-improving behaviour indexes are built 
that account for adoption of costly water-saving and energy-saving equipment/technology such as 
dual-flush toilets or energy-efficient windows. Our indexes do not necessarily represent the ‘ease’ of 
adoption. For example, it may be easier for some households to install costly solar panels than it is to 
change their habits to turn off lights. All four indexes are standardised between 0 and 100. In all cases, 
a higher index value indicates that households have adopted greater mitigation actions. It is important 
to note that from a household perspective (but not necessarily from a nation perspective), adopting 
efficiency-improving mitigation is more effective than curtailment mitigation (e.g. Gardner and Stern, 
2008).  
                                                            
4This article first attempted to analyse all five areas of behaviour. Due to measurement issues for some areas (food and 
waste), space constraints, the synergy between energy and water behaviour and the fact that energy behaviour contributes the 
most to reducing greenhouse gas emissions (Gardner and Stern, 2008), we ended up focussing on water and energy.   
5 Gardner and Stern (2008) argued that efficiency-improving actions are more effective mitigation tools than curtailment 
actions (in the sense the one-off purchase has immediate lasting effects of reducing emissions while curtailment actions must 
be repeated continuously over time). But, it is important to note that both types of mitigation behaviour are seen as important 
in reducing greenhouse gas emissions because if curtailment mitigation behaviour is more widely adopted than efficiency-
improving mitigation it may lead to greater reduction of emissions overall (Attari et al., 2010). 
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 Table 1. Definitions and summary statistics  
Table 2. Water and energy curtailment and efficiency-improving indexes 
In order to allow for possible differences between households with different intrinsic motivations, we 
distinguish between environmentally-motivated households and the rest (includes environmental 
sceptics, technological optimists and extreme responders). These classes were defined by the OECD 
following the application of a clustering methodology (see Appendix A1). Environmentally-motivated 
households (46% of the sample) believe that climate change exists and that human actions can help 
mitigate the negative consequences of climate change. The rest (non-environmentally motivated) 
undertake pro-environmental actions for a variety of other reasons, including financial motives. 
Comparing the average statistics of the households, environmentally-motivated respondents are more 
likely to have more children, a lower income, rent, live in urban/suburban areas, be female, younger 
and a member of charity organizations (Table A2 in Appendix). Table 3 depicts the average of the 
four behavioural indexes; climate change concerns and the proportion of environmentally-motivated 
households in each country. 
Table 3. Country-average water and energy adoption behaviour indexes (0-100 scale), climate 
change (CC) concerns (0-10 scale), and proportion of environmentally-motivated households 
Respondents from the Netherlands and Australia are the least concerned about climate change while 
the average level of concerns is at its highest in Korea and Chile. The proportion of environmentally-
motivated households varies from 28% in the Netherlands to 64% in Israel. Adoption of curtailment 
behaviour in both the water and energy domains is quite widespread in all countries; most of the 
average curtailment indexes being above 75. Adoption of efficiency-improving equipment was less 
common (indexes generally ranged from 30-40).   
 
3. Methodology 
A number of studies have estimated the impact of households’ perceived risk on the adoption of 
averting actions. In the environmental economics literature it is now well recognized that both actual 
risk and perceived risk cannot be treated as exogenous variables in regression models explaining 
households’ averting decisions (Bontemps and Nauges, 2016). This is for the main reason that actual 
and perceived risks depend on the actual level of safety faced by the household, itself being 
conditional on averting actions being undertaken. In such regression settings where the causality goes 
both ways (perceptions causing actions and actions influencing perceptions), usual regression 
techniques such as (one-stage) Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) produce flawed estimates and other, 
more appropriate, econometric techniques are required in order to get accurate measures of impacts. A 
simultaneity problem could also occur when measuring the impact of climate change concerns on 
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households’ mitigation actions. In order to account for the possibility that households’ level of 
concerns may be partly driven by their actions, we employ the ‘control function approach’ that is 
robust to such a simultaneity problem (also known as endogeneity bias) (see Woolridge, 2010, for 
greater details).  
The model of interest describing household i’s adoption of mitigation behaviour j (where j varies from 
1 to 4 and represents the four curtailment and efficiency-improving water- and energy-saving 
behaviours) is written as follows: 
,ij j i ijENVIND CCconcern u  'ij jX β  for j = 1,…, 4,     (1) 
where ENVIND is the behavioural index, CC concerns is the variable measuring respondents’ 
concerns about climate change, X is the vector of exogenous variables (including a constant term), 
j  and jβ  are unknown parameters to be estimated, and uij is the error term. The exogenous variables 
were chosen from the literature review, and the available questions asked in the OECD survey (see 
Table 1) and any other regional area information that was available. The model also includes country 
dummies that control for all unobserved country-specific characteristics. The latter may include 
various country specificities such as average climate, institutions, overall level of environmental 
concerns, cultural aspects etc. In order to test and control for endogeneity bias, the following equation 
is specified:  
,i ijCCconcern    ' 'ij j iX Z κ  for j = 1,…, 4.      (2) 
In Model (2) climate change concerns becomes the dependent variable and is regressed on the set of 
exogenous variables (X) and a vector of instruments (Z). Instruments should be such that they are 
correlated with climate change concerns (CC concerns), and uncorrelated with both the behavioural 
index (ENVIND) and the error term in the main equation (uij).  
The ‘control function’ approach is as follows: estimate Model (2) using OLS and obtain the residuals 
iˆj . In the second-stage an augmented version of Model (1), which includes the estimated first-stage 
residuals as an additional explanatory variable, is estimated by OLS: 
ˆ ,ij j i ij ijENVIND CCconcern     'ij jX β  for j = 1,…, 4.   (3) 
Under the assumption that Z are valid instruments, then the OLS estimation of Model (3) provides 
unbiased estimates of j , jβ  and  . The extra term which enters additively in Model (3), iˆj , is 
called the ‘control function’ and is used to test and correct for endogeneity. A rejection of the null 
assumption that 0   would be evidence for endogeneity of the variable measuring climate change 
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concerns and a positive [resp. negative]   coefficient would indicate that the impact of climate 
change concerns on households’ mitigation behaviour is under-estimated [resp. over-estimated] if 
endogeneity is not controlled for with appropriate techniques. Because the control-function approach 
involves two steps, bootstrap techniques are used in the second-stage to obtain accurate standard 
errors of the estimated coefficients. 
The application of the method described above relies on the choice of variables that meet the 
definitions of valid instruments. Such variables are difficult to find, because most variables that have 
an effect on the endogenous variable (here climate change concern) may also have a direct effect on 
the variable to be explained (here mitigation behaviour). Instruments validity can only be assessed 
through a series of tests, which include checking for both under- and over-identification of the model 
and a test for the possible weakness of the instruments: a model is said to be under-identified when 
the instruments are not correlated with the endogenous regressor, and over-identified when the 
instruments are uncorrelated with the error term and correctly excluded from the estimated equation; 
instruments would be considered weak if they are only weakly correlated with the endogenous 
variable.   
We found three instruments that passed these tests, hence can be confidently used to measure and 
correct for endogeneity bias. The first instrument was the respondent’s opinion on trustworthiness 
with regard to information on claims about the environmental impact of products, coming from 
researchers, scientists, and experts. It was measured from a scale varying from 0 (not at all 
trustworthy) to 10 (very trustworthy). The second instrument was the respondent’s average level of 
satisfaction towards their local environment including air quality, water quality (in lakes, rivers, sea), 
access to green spaces, level of noise, and management of litter and rubbish. For each of these five 
items the respondent indicated their level of satisfaction on a five-degree scale. The proposed 
instrument is an index equal to the average of the five scores. The third instrument is the country 
Environmental Performance Index (EPI - for greater details see http://epi.yale.edu/). This 0-100 index 
includes measures of protection of human health (e.g., child mortality, air pollution, access to drinking 
water and sanitation) and protection of ecosystems (e.g., wastewater treatment, pesticide regulation, 
changes in forest cover, fish stocks, carbon intensity trends). 
 
4. Results  
Table 4 presents the outcomes of eight regression models. The dependent variables are the four 
behavioural indexes representing adoption of curtailment and efficiency-improving mitigation for 
water and energy-related items. The regression models featuring these four adoption indexes as 
dependent variables are estimated separately for the group of environmentally-motivated households 
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versus the other households.6 The estimated coefficients obtained using the two-stage control function 
approach and their level of statistical significance are reported. The coefficients in the eight columns 
measure the marginal effect of a change in each explanatory variable on the corresponding 0-100 
index. First-stage model results are not shown but are available upon request. The three instruments 
were found to be highly significant in all cases: a higher trust in experts’ opinion, a lower satisfaction 
about the quality of the local environment, and a lower country EPI increase respondent’s perception 
of the seriousness of climate change. 
Table 4. Results for energy and water curtailment and efficiency-improving mitigation 
behaviour; by household type 
Our key results confirm that, in general, increases in climate change concerns impact positively on 
household mitigation behaviour, but we find some heterogeneity in the magnitude of the impact. For 
environmentally-motivated households, climate change concerns increases adoption of water and 
energy efficiency-improving mitigation, and adoption of water curtailment mitigation (the coefficient 
of climate change concerns is not statistically significant in the model describing adoption of energy 
curtailment). For those households, the marginal effect of climate change concerns (i.e., a one-unit 
increase on the 0-10 scale measuring concern) increases the index measuring water efficiency-
improving mitigation by 3.4 points (on a 0-100 scale) on average and the index of energy efficiency-
improving mitigation by 4.3 points on average. The marginal effect of climate change concerns on 
water curtailment mitigation is lower, estimated at 1.1 on average. For the other group of households, 
we find evidence that being more concerned about climate change also increases the number of 
curtailment mitigation actions undertaken in both the water and energy domains (marginal effects 
estimated at 0.8-0.9 on average), and the number of water efficiency-improving mitigation actions 
(marginal effect estimated at 1.3 on average).  
We find evidence of endogeneity of the variable measuring climate change concerns in the models 
describing adoption of efficiency-increasing mitigation by the environmentally-motivated households 
in both the water and energy areas. In these two models (columns 5 and 7 in Table 4), the coefficient 
of the control function,  , is found negative and statistically significant. This result indicates that the 
impact of climate change concerns on adoption of efficiency-increasing mitigation by 
environmentally-motivated households would be over-estimated if endogeneity was not controlled 
for.  
There are two main possible drivers of endogeneity in this model: first, and as explained earlier, a 
two-way causal relationship could be driving endogeneity if the adoption of increasing-efficiency 
                                                            
6We also re-estimated the models on the sub-sample of homeowners only because renters may not always have the 
possibility or opportunity to undertake increasing-efficiency actions. The main results and conclusions were found to be on 
the whole similar to Table 4 results (additional analysis available upon request). 
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actions was (in turn) altering the level of household concerns. In this case, because the   coefficient 
has a negative sign, this would suggest that the adoption of increasing-efficiency actions induces 
environmentally-motivated households to become less concerned about climate change. This could 
happen if households who invest in expensive mitigation behaviour feel less concerned as a 
consequence, possibly through the presence of moral leaking or licensing effects. Another possible 
source of endogeneity is the unobservability of important variables in our model. If some unobserved 
variables drive both climate change concerns and households’ mitigation actions, then this will also 
produce an endogeneity bias. Unfortunately, because our data are only cross-sectional (i.e., collected 
at a single point in time), we are unable to identify whether a bi-directional causality or/and the 
omission of important variables are the main drivers of endogeneity. However, given that there is 
statistical evidence of an endogeneity bias only for the sub-group of environmentally-motivated 
households who engaged in energy and water efficiency-improving mitigation, we believe it is more 
likely to originate from the two-way causality. Indeed if endogeneity was caused by omitted variables, 
we would expect it to be present for both types of households and both types of mitigation behaviour. 
Our results across eleven OECD countries indicate that in terms of driving household mitigation 
behaviour, economic incentives induce efficiency-improving energy mitigation only for the non-
environmentally-motivated. This is similar to Clot et al. (2014) who found (in experiments) that 
regulation did not work well on environmentally-motivated individuals but it did work well with other 
non-intrinsically motivated individuals. Economic incentives are also a much stronger influence on 
energy curtailment mitigation behaviour of the non-environmentally motivated. However, water 
pricing economic incentives positively influence both water efficiency-improving and curtailment 
mitigation of both environmentally and non-environmentally motivated households. 
In addition, it seems that it is higher household income that enables environmentally-motivated 
households to adopt efficiency-improving energy mitigation, while it is the cost of energy/economic 
incentives that is the more relevant driving factor for non-environmentally motivated households. 
Higher household income is a negative influence on curtailment behaviour: poorer households are 
much more likely to be careful about energy and water-use than richer households. Therefore, having 
a higher income may allow environmentally-motivated households to ‘buy’ their way out feeling 
guilty over using a lot of energy or water by investing in efficiency-improving mitigation. Poorer 
households, on the other hand, address their climate change concerns by undertaking more curtailment 
mitigation behaviour. 
Finally our results indicate that charity involvement, which may be related to altruistic values, is 
strongly positively correlated with the number of efficiency-improving and curtailment mitigation 
actions undertaken by both groups of households.  
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5. Discussion and conclusion  
Using a household survey covering eleven OECD countries, we confirmed that a) households’ climate 
change concerns do positively impact on mitigation behaviour and b) economic incentives are positive 
significant influences on mitigation behaviour. We also found new evidence that the relationship 
between concerns and behaviour may be more complex in the sense that the causality may go both 
ways. This effect (revealed through endogeneity tests) occurs primarily for efficiency-improving 
mitigation and in households that hold certain environmental values, namely environmentally-
motivated households who believe human actions can help mitigate climate change. As a result it 
seemed there was a lessening of climate change concerns after taking mitigation action, possibly 
because of the presence of the moral leaking or the moral licensing effect. However, we have to 
remain cautious in interpreting this result since endogeneity may also originate from the presence of 
omitted variables. Unfortunately, the cross-sectional form of our data does not allow us to further 
investigate the two-way causality relationship. However, given that the feedback effect statistically 
significantly occurred mainly in environmentally-motivated households who engaged in energy and 
water efficiency-improving mitigation and nowhere else, we believe it seems more likely that this is a 
moral leaking or licensing effect than an omitted variable effect. Further experiments or panel datasets 
that follow households’ concerns and behaviour over time would be needed to explore this 
relationship further. 
Our results also show that households’ mitigation behaviour as a response to climate change concerns 
and economic incentives vary across households’ types. Albeit, the OECD data only allowed us to test 
very basic water and electricity charging across regions and countries, it is not possible to say whether 
more sophisticated pricing schemes (e.g. as outlined for water in California by Baerenklau et al., 
2014) would work in incentivising households who hold such environmental values. 
Even in the face of such feedback effects we believe that there is cause to be positive as there are tools 
available to change people’s behaviour. But, no-one policy choice (e.g. regulation; economic 
incentives; or education) will be the answer; a portfolio of targeted incentives and information is 
needed. Economic incentives (e.g., pricing, subsidies and taxes) can play a significant and positive 
role, especially when households do not have any intrinsic motivation to take pro-environmental 
actions. For different population cohorts, sustainability education, environmental awareness, 
emphasising the co-benefits of increased action (Bain et al., 2015) and environmental messaging 
about avoiding overestimating benefits (Clot et al., 2014) may be some of the best ways to change 
behaviour and limit the feedback effect, especially when that behaviour includes very costly actions. 
Further consideration of a portfolio of approaches will be needed. In some countries (e.g. particularly 
developed countries), information on households is readily available, which makes it easier and cost-
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effective to implement such strategies, as compared to other countries where implementing a mix of 
policies is more difficult. 
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Table 1. Definitions and summary statistics  
Variables definitions Mean Min Max 
 
Respondent’s ranking of climate change seriousness on a scale from 0 (not at all 
serious) to 10 (extremely serious). 
7.62 0 10 
Respondent’s gender: takes the value 1 if the respondent is a male, and 0 otherwise. 0.49 0 1 
Respondent’s age measured in number of years. 42 18 69 
Respondent’s education: takes the value 1 if the respondent completed one or more 
years of education after high school, and 0 otherwise. 
0.79 0 1 
Respondent’s employment status: takes the value 1 if the respondent is either an 
employee or self-employed, and 0 if he/she is retired, homemaker, unemployed, 
student, or unable to work.  
0.63 0 1 
Household’s size: number of household members.a 2.89 1 5 
Number of household members who are below 18 years of age.a 0.64 0 5 
Household annual after tax income in thousand euros.b 37.9 2.3 159. 1 
Ownership status: takes the value 1 if the respondent or a member of his/her 
household owns the current primary residence, and 0 otherwise.  
0.63 0 1 
Location: takes the value 1 if the household lives in a major town/city or in a 
suburban area, and 0 otherwise. 
0.66 0 1 
Type of residence: takes the value 1 if the household lives in a detached or semi-
detached/terraced house, and 0 otherwise. 
0.54 0 1 
Life satisfaction index: respondent’s ranking of his/her satisfaction with life at the 
moment from 0 (very dissatisfied) to 10 (very satisfied). 
6.39 0 10 
Respondent’s involvement in charitable organisations: takes the value 1 if the 
respondent has supported or participated in the activities of charitable organisations 
(includes membership, personal time, and/or financial donations), and 0 otherwise. 
0.27 0 1 
Electricity charge: takes the value 1 if the household pays for electricity according 
to how much electricity is used, and 0 otherwise. 
0.91 0 1 
Water charge: takes the value 1 if the household pays for water according to how 
much water is used, and 0 otherwise 
0.73 0 1 
Trust in experts: respondent’s opinion on trustworthiness with regard to information 
on claims about the environmental impact of products, coming from researchers, 
scientists, and experts, on a scale from 0 (not at all trustworthy) to 10 (very 
trustworthy).  
7.01 0 10 
Local environment satisfaction index: respondent’s average level of satisfaction 
towards air quality, water quality (in lakes, rivers, sea), access to green spaces, level 
of noise, and management of litter and rubbish in his/her local environmentc  
-0.15 -2 1.8 
a The variable was set equal to 5 if the respondent answered “five or more”.  
b Respondents were asked to choose one of 10 income intervals (intervals were adjusted for each country in 
order to ensure a reasonable distribution across the different bands). Responses were then converted into a 
continuous income variable: midpoints were taken for the eight intermediate intervals and non-linear curves 
were fit for each country in order to generate the values for the lowest and highest income bands.  
c For each of these five items the respondent had to indicate its level of satisfaction on a five-degree scale: -2 
(very dissatisfied), -1 (dissatisfied), 0 (no opinion), 1 (satisfied), and 2 (very satisfied). The index is the average 
of the five scores. 
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Table 2. Water and energy curtailment and efficiency-improving indexes 
Water Energy 
Curtailmenta Efficiency-improvingb Curtailmenta Efficiency-improvingb 
 turning off the water 
while brushing teeth;  
 plugging the sink when 
washing the dishes by 
hand;  
 watering the garden in 
the coolest part of the 
day to reduce 
evaporation and save 
water;  
 collecting rainwater or 
recycling waste water;  
 rinsing dishes before 
putting them in the 
dishwasher;  
 taking showers instead 
of baths. 
Current adoption of the 
following: 
 low volume or dual 
flush toilets;  
 water flow restrictor 
taps/low flow shower 
heads;  
 water tank to collect 
rainwater. 
 turning off lights when 
leaving a room;  
 cutting down on 
heating/air 
conditioning to limit 
energy consumption; 
 only running full loads 
when using washing 
machines or 
dishwashers;  
 washing clothes using 
cold water rather than 
warm/hot water;  
 switching off standby 
mode of appliances/ 
electronic devices;  
 using air-dry laundry 
rather than a clothes 
dryer. 
Current adoption of the 
following: 
 top rated energy-
efficient appliances;  
 low-energy light bulbs;  
 energy-efficient 
windows;  
 thermal insulation of 
walls/roof;  
 heat thermostats;  
 solar panels for 
electricity of hot water; 
  wind turbines;  
 ground-source heat 
pumps. 
a For each of these two low-cost habits, household gets a score of 1 if it never performs it, 2 if it performs it 
occasionally, 3 if it performs it often, and 4 if it always performs it. A missing value indicates that the question 
was not relevant. The index is the mean of scores calculated over the number of non-missing responses. 
b Both indexes are based on the household’s adoption of relevant equipment/devices over the past ten years. For 
each of these items, household gets a score of 1 if it has been installed in its current primary residence over the 
last ten years, and 0 otherwise. The score is set to missing if installation of the equipment was not possible (for 
example because the household is renting its residence and only the landlord could install the equipment). The 
index is the mean of scores calculated over the number of non-missing responses. 
 
 
Table 3. Country-average water and energy adoption behaviour indexes (0-100 scale), climate change 
(CC) concerns (0-10 scale), and proportion of environmentally-motivated households 
Energy Water 
Curtailment 
Efficiency-
improving Curtailment 
Efficiency-
improving 
CC 
concern 
Env-
motivated 
Australia 84 37 86 47 6.88 0.42 
Canada 78 42 77 36 7.35 0.46 
Chile 87 26 72 26 8.87 0.54 
France 85 42 83 48 7.40 0.56 
Israel 82 30 70 41 7.93 0.64 
Japan 78 23 58 17 7.54 0.30 
Korea 84 36 65 20 8.77 0.38 
Netherlands 78 37 77 43 6.60 0.28 
Spain 88 37 78 36 7.95 0.37 
Sweden 67 39 74 32 7.21 0.55 
Switzerland 76 38 75 36 7.48 0.48 
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Table 4. Results for energy and water curtailment and efficiency-improving mitigation behaviour; by 
household type 
Adoption type Energy curtailment Water  
curtailment 
Energy efficiency-
improving 
Water efficiency-
improving 
Household cluster Env- 
mot. 
 
Other Env- 
mot. 
Other Env- 
mot. 
Other Env- 
mot. 
Other 
Respondent’s characteristics        
Respondent is a male† -2.146*** -2.299*** -0.198 -0.653 -1.702** -1.069 -0.538 1.821* 
Respondent’s age 0.069*** 0.035** 0.141*** 0.083*** 0.086*** 0.085*** 0.331*** 0.198*** 
Post high-school 
education† 0.872
* 0.255 0.356 -0.314 2.295** 2.113** 0.537 2.470** 
Employee status† 0.076 -1.004** 0.384 -0.677 -0.237 -0.661 0.337 -0.835 
Life satisfaction index 0.153* 0.086 0.077 0.090 -0.051 0.147 0.441 0.052 
Charity involvement† 1.026*** 0.465 1.748*** 2.421*** 2.676*** 2.810*** 4.008*** 5.413*** 
Climate change concern -0.148 0.939*** 1.127** 0.809*** 4.288*** 0.664 3.440** 1.344** 
Control function 0.681 -0.165 -0.606 -0.205 -3.83*** -0.329 -2.442* -0.847 
Household’s (HH) characteristics        
HH size 0.098 -0.316 0.084 0.375 0.494 0.710 0.798 1.976*** 
HH members below 18 0.290 0.153 0.414 0.017 0.977* 0.706 1.683** -0.584 
HH annual income -0.043*** -0.034*** -0.036*** -0.033*** 0.070*** 0.030 0.011 -0.001 
HH ownership† -0.225 -0.319 0.168 0.723 -4.186*** -3.747*** 3.071** 4.684*** 
Town or suburban area† 0.248 0.012 0.085 -0.877* -0.145 -0.700 0.995 -1.562 
House† 0.888** 1.287*** 0.865* 0.751 -3.860*** -2.399*** 5.292*** 0.364 
Economic incentives        
Electricity charge† 2.405*** 3.751*** - - 1.001 4.784*** - - 
Water charge† - - 1.889*** 1.154** - - 4.461*** 3.937*** 
Region         
Regional adoption 0.236** 0.183* 0.304*** 0.310*** 0.071 0.368*** 0.084 0.193* 
Model characteristics         
Number of observations 4,611 5,355 4,611 5,355 4,542 5,269 4,212 4,948 
R-squared 0.22 0.19 0.25 0.22 0.08 0.06 0.12 0.12 
Tests of instruments validity       
Under-identification test 
p-value 
267.2 
0.000 
649.5 
0.000 
265.2 
0.000 
651.1 
0.000 
265.3 
0.000 
636.8 
0.000 
220.6 
0.000 
619.7 
0.000 
Over-identification test 
p-value 
0.139 
0.709 
0.244 
0.621 
0.499 
0.480 
0.063 
0.802 
0.036 
0.851 
3.256 
0.071 
0.002 
0.962 
0.066 
0.798 
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1. † indicates the variable takes values 0 and 1 only. Country-specific 
dummies are not shown here but are available upon request, and are shown in the Appendix’s Table A3 full 
sample results.  
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Appendices 
 
A1. Description of the clustering methodology 
The clustering was performed by the OECD Environment Directorate (for greater details, see OECD, 2014). A 
latent class analysis was used to identify attitudinal profiles of the respondents. Three major classes were 
identified based on the respondents’ level of agreement (strongly disagree, disagree, agree, strongly agree, no 
opinion) with the following seven statements about environmental policy: i) Policies introduced by the 
government to address environmental issues should not cost me extra money; ii) I am willing to make 
compromises in my current lifestyle for the benefit of the environment; iii) Protecting the environment is a 
means of stimulating economic growth; iv) Environmental issues will be resolved in any case through 
technological progress; v) Environmental impacts are frequently overstated; vi) I am not willing to do anything 
about the environment if others don’t do the same; and vii) Environmental issues should be dealt with primarily 
by future generations. The three classes were labelled by the OECD as: environmentally motivated, 
environmental sceptics, and technological optimists. Quoting the OECD: “The environmentally motivated 
comprise just under half of the pooled sample [...]. They believe that environmental problems are real and 
express a willingness to make compromises in their lifestyle to solve them. Members of this class also expressed 
the least need for reciprocation from others in order to undertake action to solve environmental problems. 
Environmental sceptics believe that environmental issues are overstated and do not wish to pay for government 
environmental policies. But, on the other hand, they do report a general willingness to make compromises for 
the benefit of the environment, though not to the same degree as the other two substantive classes. 
Technological optimists share the belief with the environmentally motivated cluster that environmental problems 
are real and appear willing to make lifestyles compromises to solve them. The key difference between the two 
clusters is that the first group expresses a greater belief in the potential of technological progress to solve 
environmental problems.” (OECD, 2014; 67-69).
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A2. Mean characteristics of environmentally-motivated households versus the rest and outcome of mean 
comparison test 
Variablesa Env-motivated Others Significance of 
t-testb 
Mitigation behaviour    
Curtailment - energy 82 80 *** 
Curtailment - water 76 73 *** 
Efficiency-improving - energy 36 34 *** 
Efficiency-improving - water 37 34 *** 
     
Respondents’ characteristics     
Respondent is a male† 0.40 0.56 *** 
Respondent’s age 41.1 42.8 *** 
Post high-school education† 0.79 0.78 n.s. 
Employee status† 0.63 0.63 n.s. 
Life satisfaction index 6.39 6.39 n.s. 
Charity involvement† 0.31 0.24 *** 
Climate change concern 8.4 7.0 *** 
    
Household’s characteristics    
Household size 2.91 2.88 n.s. 
HH members below 18 0.67 0.61 *** 
HH annual income 36.995 38.593 *** 
Ownership of the residence† 0.61 0.64 *** 
Town or suburban area† 0.67 0.65 ** 
House† 0.52 0.55 *** 
     
Economic incentives     
Electricity charge† 0.91 0.91 n.s. 
Water charge† 0.70 0.74 *** 
a A † following the name of a variable indicates that the variable takes values 0 and 1 only. HH stands for 
households.  
b *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; n.s. for not significant. 
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A3. Estimated coefficients for curtailment and efficiency-improving in energy and water mitigation 
behaviour; full sample 
Adoption type Energy Water 
Variablea Curtailment Efficiency Curtailment Efficiency 
Coef.b Coef. Coef. Coef. 
Respondent’s characteristics  
Respondent is a male† -2.392*** -1.133* -0.488 0.653 
Respondent’s age 0.048*** 0.091*** 0.110*** 0.266*** 
Post high-school education† 0.541* 1.980*** -0.055 1.568* 
Employee status† -0.498* -0.570 -0.214 -0.210 
Life satisfaction index 0.105 0.027 0.074 0.257 
Charity involvement† 0.821*** 2.720*** 2.180*** 4.614*** 
Climate change concern 0.708*** 1.639*** 0.970*** 1.860*** 
Control function 0.050 -1.208*** -0.316 -1.119** 
Household’s characteristics   
Household size -0.123 0.596* 0.212 1.445*** 
HH members below 18 0.256 0.821** 0.263 0.534 
HH annual income -0.038*** 0.049*** -0.033*** 0.000 
Ownership of the residence† -0.164 -4.084*** 0.542 4.153*** 
Town or suburban area† 0.113 -0.276 -0.429 -0.392 
House† 1.026*** -2.794*** 0.669* 2.625*** 
Economic incentives     
Electricity charge† 2.994*** 3.119*** - - 
Water charge† - - 1.563*** 4.088*** 
Regional adoption and country dummies    
Regional adoption 0.199*** 0.226*** 0.292*** 0.147* 
Korea (reference base) - - - - 
Australia 1.967*** 4.706*** 16.619*** 25.737*** 
Canada -2.794*** 7.344*** 10.199*** 15.524*** 
Chile 2.030*** -5.819*** 3.731*** 2.509 
France 1.882*** 7.269*** 14.088*** 25.446*** 
Israel -0.772 -3.349** 3.932*** 19.049*** 
Japan -3.085*** -8.623*** -3.710*** -1.983 
Netherlands -3.513*** 5.709*** 9.281*** 22.335*** 
Spain 3.725*** 2.071* 9.644*** 13.975*** 
Sweden -12.287*** 5.794*** 7.923*** 13.844*** 
Switzerland -3.802*** 0.791 9.222*** 17.728*** 
     
No. of obs. 10,155 9,979 10,151 9,326 
R-squared 0.2033 0.0671 0.2268 0.1138 
     
Tests of instruments validity  
Under-identification test 1163.23*** 1144.36*** 1157.65*** 1060.76*** 
Over-identification test 0.012 1.155 0.376 0.000 
a A † following the name of a variable indicates that the variable takes values 0 and 1 only. HH stands for 
households.  
b *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1. 
 
